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Conditions and options for an
autonomous „Common European
Policy on Security and Defence“
in and by the European Union
in the post-Amsterdam perspective
opened at Cologne in June 1999
I. Introduction
According to the European Council’s Declaration on „the strengthening of
the Common European Policy on Security and Defence“
1 issued at Co-
logne on June 4
th 1999, which follows the direction given by the „British-
French Joint Declaration on European Defence“, adopted at St. Malo on
December 4
th 1998, the European Union is to provide the institutional
framework for a future „autonomous“ European military contribution to
international security
2. The essential legal basis for such „action“ in in-
ternational crisis and conflict situations, which would not correspond to
„article 5 contingencies“ of the North Atlantic alliance treaty and there-
fore would not constitute a case for NATO „collective defence“ with the
1 The acronym would be CEPSD, but the German EU Presidency used „Common
European Security and Defence Policy“, i. e. CESDP which corresponds with
„Common Foreign and Security Policy“ CFSP.
2 See official document, British Embassy Bonn, 13.7.99.Lothar Rühl
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commitment of all the allies including the US and Canada, is to be the
Union Treaty of Amsterdam, effective as of 1999
3.
The common security and defence policy is to be set into the framework
of the CFSP as defined by the union treaties of Maastricht and Amster-
dam and accordingly limited to the „Petersberg Tasks“ agreed upon in
1992 by the partners of the WEU and inscribed into the Amsterdam
treaty. It should be conceived as a part of the latter. In the wording of the
Cologne decisions and the report of the German presidency, adopted by
the Council as expression of the agreement between the member-states
4,
the „development of a common European security and defence policy“ is
meant to „strengthen the CFSP“
5. To this end „capacity for autonomous
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use
them, and the readiness to do so“ and „appropriate“ organisms and pro-
cedures for decision-making are deemed necessary by the Chiefs of State
and Government assembled at Cologne, „in order to respond to interna-
tional crises“. In the „Declaration of the European Council“ on the
„Common European Policy on Security and Defence“ the „intention“ is
expressed to provide the EU with „the necessary means and capabilities“
for „conflict prevention and crisis management“ in order to „contribute to
international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the
UN Charter without prejudice to actions by NATO“. The „measures“ to
be taken in such contingencies by the EU „irrespectively“ of NATO re-
quire „military as well as political and economic“ means.
3 See Annex III European Council: “Declaration on Strengthening of The Common
European Policy on Security And Defence”, attached to “Presidency Conclusions
Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999.” (In the Presidency Conclusions
the term “Common European Security and Defence Policy” is used); see i. p. un-
der “3. Decision Making”.
4 See i.p. “Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on
Security and defence”, Cologne, 3 / 4 June 1999, with reference to Article 17 of
the TEEU, on page 32/36 of the document.
5  See document, 118. Guiding principles.Conditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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The Chiefs of State and Government singled out certain military instru-
ments of a strategic-operational nature (see below in detail) and laid down
as the base-line a „build-up of more effective European military capabili-
ties, based on the existing national, binational and multinational capabili-
ties“, which means: tied to the various military structures and assets,
most of which are now either within the NATO military framework as
forces or force components „assigned“ to Allied Command Europe or
committed to NATO for defence in case of an „article 5 contingency“.
The conclusions of the German presidency specify that in building up
such European armed forces, „unnecessary duplications be avoided“ (see
120. Implementation), but also that „the availability for the EU of NATO
planning capacities“, which can „contribute to the military planning of
EU-led missions“, must be „assured“ as well as that of „NATO capabili-
ties and common assets, identified in advance (pre-designated) for the use
in EU-led operations“
6.
For the „military capabilities“ required, the EU member-states „must de-
velop armed forces (including Head Quarters) appropriate for crisis man-
agement operations“. Such forces are described by five „main qualities“:
„deployability”, “sustainability”, “interoperability”, “flexibility” and
“mobility“. In support of these requirements specific capabilities are to be
created for the EU, in particular: „situation analysis“ capacity, „access to
intelligence“ and „the capability for relevant strategic planning“. For
these purposes the European Council enumerated as „particularly neces-
sary“ and „required“:
– regular or special (ad hoc) sessions of the „General Affairs Council“
of the EU, as appropriate including Defence Ministers,
– a permanent group in Brussels (called “Political and Security Com-
mittee) consisting of representatives (of each country) „with politi-
cal/military expertise“,
6 See (German) Presidency’s Conclusions document, o. c.Lothar Rühl
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– a „EU Military Committee“ consisting of „Military Representatives,
who make recommendations“ to the “Political and Security Commit-
tee”,
– a „EU Military Staff „ including a Situation Centre”,
– „other resources, i. p. a Satellite Centre“ and an „Institute for Security
Studies“.
EU-led operations without reliance on NATO assets and force structures
could be conducted by „European national or multinational means, which
are “pre-identified” (defined in advance or “pre-designated” in NATO
terms) by the member-states”. In such cases „either the national command
structures, which provide for a multinational representation in the Head
Quarters, or existing command structures within the multinational forces“
would have to be used „for an effective conduct of EU-led operations“. In
case of the use of „NATO means and capabilities, including European
command & control“ by the EU for its operations, the decisions taken in
Berlin in 1996 and in Washington in april 1999 by the NAC are to be car-
ried out to-gether „with further agreements, as sketched out at the Wash-
ington Summit“ and referred to in the Cologne EU presidency’s document
(point 120. Implementation), adopted by the European Council on the
„Common European Policy on Security and Defence“
7.
According tho the Cologne documents, decisions on EU international se-
curity support operations, in particular those with military consequences
and implication for defence policy are to be taken according to article 23
of the Treaty on the European Union, while the member-states „will in all
cases reserve for themselves the prerogative of deciding, if and when
7 See Presidency’s Conclusions, o.c. In the official German text of Chancellor
Schröders Conclusions for the Presidency of the EC, the term chosen is “Gemein-
same Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik” which translates liberally
into English as “Common European Security and Defence Policy” or CESDP:
The logic of the German version is compelling, when compared to the language of
the Amsterdam TUU “Common Foreign and security Policy” or CFSP for the
larger framework in which the Defence Policy has been set.Conditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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their national Armed Forces will be engaged“. EU-Decisions on security
and defence policy are to be associated with „the necessary measures for
assured political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg op-
erations, in order to enable the EU to decide on and conduct such opera-
tions effectively“ (point 119. of the Conclusions of the Presidency).
Three political principles for the „modalities of participation and co-
operation“ (point 121.) have been set forth at Cologne as foundation of a
„successful“ creation and implementation of CEPSD or in the English
translation from German CESDP:
– the „possibility for all EU member-states, including those members,
which are not alliance partners, to participate in full and with equal
rights („in vollem Umfang und gleichberechtigt“ in German) in EU
operations“,
– „satisfactory arrangements, based on existing agreements on consulta-
tions within the WEU, to assure that European NATO members,
which are not members of the EU, be included as far as possible in
EU-led operations“,
– „agreements ensuring equal rights for all participants in EU-led opera-
tions in the conduct of the operation“; this rule shall apply „irrespec-
tive of the principle of the autonomy of decision of the EU, in par-
ticular without prejudice to the right of the Council, to deliberate and
decide on matters of principle and on political questions“
8.
In its Cologne Declaration on the CESDP the European Council commis-
sioned the „General Affairs“ council of the EU „to create the coditions
and take the measures“ in order to meet these objectives and in particular
„to determine the modalities of the inclusion of the WEU tasks, which
will be necessary for the Union to assume its new responsibilities in the
8 All decisions in such matters having military or defence implications, must be
taken in accordance with Article 23 of the TEU, as referred to in the Annex III,
o.c. p. 33/36.Lothar Rühl
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domain of the Petersberg missions. The Council stated, that in this case
and if the political objective (to pass the necessary resolutions by the end
of the year 2000) were attained, „the WEU would have fulfilled its pur-
pose as an organisation“. It is further stated, that „the different status“ of
the (EU) member-states with respect to „guarantees of collective defence
is not affected“ and that „the alliance remains the foundation of the col-
lective defence of its members“. This would seem to mean that for the
purpose of a common „European defence policy“ membership in NATO
is not a criterion and politically not even relevant. The terms „the alli-
ance“ and „collective defence“ could refer to either NATO with the
Treaty of Washington (1949) or to the West European Treaty of Brussels
(1948 in its modified and enlaged version of 1955). It could, of course,
refer to both treaties, since these form the „Euro-Atlantic“ alliance and
security system. While it is not clear, which alliance and collective de-
fence the formulation of the Cologne texts refers to - NATO or WEU or
both - it can be assumed by implication that the ambiguous wording refers
to both, since the entire CESDP seems to be set into the alliance frame-
work of NATO and since the WEU is mentioned in the EU treaties. WEU
being in fact a regional political-military substructure of NATO and hav-
ing been recognized by the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam as an
„integral“ component of the EU with the „Petersberg tasks“ or missions
of 1992 for the WEU the only defined object of the CESDP, it stands to
reason that EU member-states, which are members of either NATO or
WEU or both (which is the case for most of them) are not impeded by the
CESDP obligations in their participation in „collective defence“ of both
„alliances“ and that non-NATO and non-WEU members of the EU are
not obliged to participate in any way in NATO-led or WEU-led security
operations, in which the EU participates or other EU members are in-
cluded: Every member’s sovereign rights as a nation-state, are formally
respected as is every states’ right to belong or not to belong to an alliance
for collective defence. The commitment of the EU to international secu-
rity simply spans the alliance relationships in the West and CESDP is to
be organized between member-states, some of which are still „neutral andConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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non-aligned“ (Austria, Ireland, Sweden and, to a degree, Finland) while
most are members of both NATO and the WEU. The CESDP of the EU
therefore is partly inside NATO and the WEU, partly only within NATO
(Denmark) and partly outside NATO and the WEU (the above mentioned
partners). The whole geopolitical configuration is narrower than NATO
with Norway and Turkey inside NATO but outside both WEU and EU. It
is less coherent in geopolitical-strategic terms with Sweden, Finland,
Austria and Ireland outside the core territory of the „Euro-Atlantic“ alli-
ance and the combined collective defence treaty areas. On the other hand,
it is wider than the old WEU part of NATO both in Northern and in
Central Europe, and while Austria is bordered to the West, North and
East by three NATO countries, Germany, Czeckia and Hungary with the
larger part of Central Europe inside NATO since 1999, the north-eastern
flank of the EU is uncovered and stretching from the North Cape to the
Baltic Sea along a common border in Finland with Russia over 1300 km.
Military security and common defence, therefore, are not a theoretical
question in the North: neither Finland nor Sweden or Norway can simply
disregard potential security risks possibly arising in Russia in the future.
The problem is compounded by the unsettled security in the Eastern Baltic
Sea with the three former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
between Finland and Poland still outside the „Euro-Atlantic“ security
system, even if they are close to the north-eastern boundaries of the en-
larged NATO, somehow associated with the US across the Atlantic Ocean
by the „Baltic Charter“ and part of the Baltic Sea co-operation with EU
members, Poland and Russia. The security situation in the North and the
Baltic area is, in strategic terms, a zone of transition with the Western-
oriented countries all forming a „Euro-Atlantic“ sphere of interest, while
Russia still considers the Eastern Baltic Sea a ‘glacis’ for national defence
and for access to the West by its trade, but also by its (now much smaller)
fleet. Whichever way one may look at the Northern region of Europe - it
presents itself as an area of ambivalence in strategic and geopolitical
terms. ‘Swedish neutrality’ ostensibly upheld in the post-confrontational
situation of Europe with the Warsaw Pact gone since 1991, ideologicallyLothar Rühl
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even re-inforced by the renewed political doctrine in Stockholm after the
Carl Bildt interlude, reflects this ambivalence of North European security
between NATO and Russia with the Northern wing of the EU in between
as are the three Baltic countries.
The situation in the North is but one of the West European security prob-
lem areas. The situation in the South-East is even more complex and in
addition it is explosive - a high risk area, as the Kosovo War has shown
after the Bosnian War with several countries on the outskirts of both
NATO and the EU in unsettled internal conditions and difficult relations
with their neighbours. The South-East is the typical „Petersberg task
zone“ in Europe. But neither the WEU nor the EU have been particularly
active there in real terms of ‘hard security’. If a change were to take
placec in the EU in favour of an active common security and defence
policy to serve both a common foreign policy of the EU member-states in
a crisis and international order, then it would have to occur on this mined
terrain.
However, in the South-East both the WEU and the EU are particularly
weak and exposed to danger from across their outer boundaries as is the
case in the third problem area of Western Europe: The Mediterranean
Sea-Black Sea region with the Balkans to the West, the Levant and the
Caucasus to the East and the „Wider Middle East“ behind, stretching
from Central Asia in the North and the Gulf to the South with Iran, Irak,
Saudi-Arabia across Asia minor and the Near East with Turkey, Syria,
Jordan, Israel and Palestine to Egypt and North Africa close to Greece,
Italy, France and Spain on the Southern seaboard of Western Europe. In
this vast region of great political-economic and ethnic-cultural diversity
but also with considerable armed forces, an as yet uncrontolled spread of
nuclear, chemical and biological means of mass destruction, missile tech-
nology and longer range vectors, and several conflicts of historical di-
mensions with deeply rooted hostilities between peoples, fragile or even
failed states, authoritarian or dictatorial governments, unsettled quarrels
over borders and pieces of territory such as East-Jerusalem and continu-Conditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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ing rivalries in the regional power games, the EU as NATO is confronted
with latent threats and permanent explosive dangers to their security. The
North Atlantic Council, on which most EU governments are represented
by their Heads, foreign and defence ministers, has twice pointed to these
security risks, adding that of terrorism and that of barriers to access to the
oil&gas reserves in the Middle East, in Rome 1991 after the Gulf War
and in Washington in 1999 in the middle of the Kosovo War, while the
‘peace process in the Middle East’ remained blocked and the situations on
the Southern border of Turkey, in Irak, in Lebanon and in Algeria as un-
settled as eight years before. The same can be said of Cyprus and of the
relations between Turkey and Greece with a maritime field of tensions
between them and their alliance in NATO frozen at zero point. Where
then is the common ground between the EU member-states vis-a-vis this
new „Oriental Question“ for Europe, concerning the relations with Tur-
key, but also those with Iran and Irak, with Israel and Palestine, with
Egypt or with Algeria? How could a common understanding be defined
and promoted in dealing with such challenges as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’
or simply with mass emigration to Europe? What could be the meaning,
the scope, the range and the means of the CESDP in this ‘strategic direc-
tion’ of European policy in the European interest, if there were one?
What does the „Southern flank“ of Europe’s security and defence mean if
it is not resting on Turkey as its natural geopolitical corner-stone and a
„strategic partner“? - as three consecutive US Presidents since 1981 have
defined the American-Turkish relationship in NATO, demanding of the
EU to take this quality of Turkey’s value for „Euro-Atlantic“ security in-
terests into account and to treat the Turkish ally accordingly with more
understanding for Turkey’s difficult internal problems. How could the
problems of the Southern flank be solved without Greek concessions to
Turkey as a long-standing candidate for membership in the EC/EU? And
how could Cyprus be admitted to the EU, unless there were a Turkish-
Greek accord and a consolidated détente between the Turkish and Greek
Cypriote populations? How could the EU „transfer“ or „project stability“
into the Black Sea area and stabilize all of „South Eastern Europe“ with-Lothar Rühl
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out Turkish active co-operation, Turkey being part - if only by a small
territorial margin - of South Eastern Europe and at the same time the
main Black Sea country since the end of the Soviet Union with the inde-
pendence of Moldova, Ukraine and Geogia? As long as Turkey remains
outside the EU and WEU, „Europe“ will have both wings for its own de-
fence clipped by self-inflicted amputation of the ‘flank country’ in the
South and a lack of attractiveness towards the ‘flank country’ in the
North, Norway, while NATO includes both, but does not attract Sweden
and Finland on the Northern flank, who participate in the CFSP, may
participate in the new CESDP, if they so wish, but stay, so far, out of the
WEU, which is to be somehow incorporated or even absorbed in the se-
curity & defence structures of the EU. These contradictions cause a vast
incongruency in the geopolitics of the „Atlantic Europe“ and in those of
the „European integration“ in the EU.
The question than arises: Where is the „European Security and Defence
Identity“ to be found - inside NATO or outside or perhaps - in a ‘half-
way house’ of European security? The same observation applies to the
notion of a ‘European pillar’ of common defence in the alliance: Since the
EU treaty territory is partly inside, partly outside NATO, as it is, in
1999, only in part congruent with the treaty territory of the WEU, the
foundation of this pillar has to reach beyond alliances boundaries - at least
for the WEU, since its binding alliance clause for armed support of a
member-state under a threat of aggression, according to article 4 of the
1948 Brussels Treaty, cannot be automatically applied to the non-allied
states of the EU: Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Austria. Once
„the WEU as an organisation will have fulfilled its purpose“ in the words
of the Cologne summit text, this incongruency will have to be dealt with
by the EU, if a coherent and contiguous common defence ist to be organ-
ized, covering the treaty territory of the EU - even if not all EU members
take part in a common defence or even in the CESDP, based on the Am-
sterdam Treaty. For this purpose of re-arranging and optimizing Western
Europe’s institutional security policy, the core of the Brussels Treaty must
be preserved for the wider EU if a „European defence“ is the finality ofConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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the common effort, since article 4 of the WEU treaty is more binding and
compelling in terms of military assistance than article 5 of the North At-
lantic treaty (see below, II./3.). Since the CESDP is distinct from „col-
lective defence“ and from „alliance“ policies and since it is oriented to-
wards the WEU „Petersberg missions“ of 1992, for which its efforts and
assets seem to be reserved, in order not to „duplicate“ investments in
structures, forces, efforts and assets for NATO, the question about a suit-
able division of labour between EU/WEU and NATO has to be answered
for the intermediate ‘grey area’ contingencies, such as in the Balkans, and
the issue of ‘interlocking’ versus ‘overlapping’ has to be addressed. Until
this task has been accomplished, a measure of ambiguity will remain as to
what the „strengthened“ CESDP can and will achieve by its own military
means, with or without NATO assets.
II. Conditions
This ambiguity and the basic condition of limitation ask the question of
the nature of the „autonomy“ of EU military actions in persuance of
aims, defined by the organisms of the CFSP as the frame of reference for
all operations of the CEPSD or (in the liberal translation from the official
text of the German Presidency) CESDP in an international crisis or armed
conflict. Given the limitations on defence budgets, arms procurement on
authorization by national parliaments, legal constraints and international
arms control by contractual ceilings on forces and heavy conventional
arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals within the CFE treaty area,
obvious problems for European security and defence policy arise from the
declaration of intent, issued at Cologne, but above all from the scarcity of
resources and the ensuing competitive demands on these limits resources
for different purposes and different political commitments as well as for
different force structures and military capabilities. For this reason, the
Chiefs of State and Government introduced the qualification „progressive
framing“ (in the German text „step by step“) for the envisaged „common
defence policy“ (in the framework of the CFSP), insisted on „continuingLothar Rühl
14
sustained defence efforts with the necessary adaptations, i. p. the
strengthening of (the) capabilities for strategic reconaissance, strategic
transport as well as command & control of armed forces“, adding the re-
quirement for joint exercises and joint structures of national and multina-
tional European forces. The „strengthening of the industrial and techno-
logical defence basis“ is another admonition in the Cologne text of June
4
th 1999
9.
The required conditions for effective solutions to the problems posed by
the state of security policy in Europe and for the implementation of the
CESDP project, are:
– economic-industrial,
– organizational-fiancial/budgetary (allocation and management of re-
sources),
– political-institutional (decision-making, political control and strategic
orientation),
– strategic-operational (planning, preparing options for contingen-
cies/force components).
1. The economic-industrial basis exists in bits and pieces, some national,
some multinational or bi-national on the pattern of interallied defence co-
operation with joint armament projects. It has yet to be assembled on a
European scale.
One precondition is a clear executive responsibility with a proper budget
in the EU Commission. Only if the Commission is responsible for taking
defence needs into account in formulating its policy on technology and
indusrtrial development, but also on competitive bidding and concentra-
tion in arms production for a truly European procurement, ip. in the aero-
space domain, in missile technology and for naval constructions, will the
EU acquire the capacity of dealing with the problem of standardized
9 See Presidency’s Conclusion, o. c.Conditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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equipments and standardized procurement of arms and military matériel
for European forces by agreement between the EU partners. It has to be
understood, that in competition with American firms, already advantaged
by the US military procurement policies and by US arms exports policies,
European producers are not ahead even in Europe itself, unless their na-
tional governments support them by their procurement policies and by
subsidies to State-owned companies or companies with large State shares.
Concentration is a European requirement in competition with US firms
and it must be multinational between EU members with armed forces.
Therefore the EU Commission must not put socalled „anti-trust“ or „anti-
monopoly“ considerations above the inevitable concentration in the Euro-
pean interest in building the CFSP and CESDP (or CEPSD) into a com-
mon European defence and security effort within the North Atlantic alli-
ance, and the EU budget must provide for support of multinational con-
centration in defence industries for this purpose.
A second requirement is privatization of the defence industries. This is
paramount for business-like dealings between the various companies, i. p.
across national borders and a conditio-sine-qua-non for the formation of
bi- or multinational companies in Europe as elsewhere. The most formi-
dable obstacle to joint technological development and production of
weapons systems between France and Germany has been, at all times and
under all circumstances, the political interest of the French government in
protecting specific production capabilities, individual plants or factories,
testing installations and the jobs there-in. Here lies the main reason for
the failure since the 1960ies of building a Franco-German main battle
tank and one of the reasons for the difficulties encountered over 15 years
for the concept and realization of the Franco-German combat helicopter.
In aircraft production, the French combination of powerful private and
public companies’ interests with the government directly involved, has
proven an unsurmountable barrier for the ill-fated project of a Franco-
German fighter aircraft or later the „Eurofighter 2000“ with French par-
ticipation. The largely negative experience with France has led GermanLothar Rühl
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industries to look across the Channel for British co-operation and, of
course, across the Alps to Italian partners. It is in the best European in-
terest for economically sound procurement of costly technologies and
weapons systems or high-value equipments, to encourage and help priva-
tization and its results: private companies, i. p. multinational ones. Na-
tional producers, whether corporate or public, will often fall behind for-
eign competitors - this is usually the case in competing with large US
corporations. Privatization should therefore be seen as a pre-condition for
multinational corporations, which are inevitable, if European industries
are to stand their ground and to preserve their chances to participate in
technological progress and international business - especially in the aero-
space domain.
A third necessity is for the EU Commission to encourage and advantage
national policies of members aiming at European solutions for the stan-
dardized equipment of European forces and for European joint ventures in
the US market, including jointness with US producers and joint exports to
countries, which can be considered useful partners in international secu-
rity and for the promotion of regional stability (such as Saudi-Arabia, Is-
rael, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan or Egypt, Turkey being entit-
led to receive Western arms as a NATO ally).
Fourth requirement is a European arms and military technology export
policy, if European armaments production is to prosper on a high tech-
nology level, since the size of forces in Europe is too small for a self-
supporting European market for defence equipments. Such a policy must
be associated with arms export controls and has to be conceptualized not
as a barrier against exports or as a strategy of denial of European arma-
ments options, but rather as a part of a co-ordinated international security
strategy for crisis-stability and co-operative security, by which vulnerable
and valuable overseas partners of Europe outside NATO can be effec-
tively supported by arms deliveries and logistical co-operation (which of-
ten offers influence, even if it always creates mutual dependance in politi-
cal decisions). The lack of such a European policy in the EU has led toConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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the wide-ranging anarchy in the competition between European firms and
governments, trying to sell their arms abroad, outbidding each other and
hence loosing control entirely both of the terms of trade and of the use
made of their exports (as in the case of Irak). In times of small European
defence budgets and smaller forces arms exports become a major element
in every decision on arms production and procurement, even on research
and development projects. Therefore, the export option cannot be simply
denied to the European producers. Such national policies of self-denial, as
in the case of Germany, always were a problem for inter-allied co-
operation. The problem could only be solved by exemptions and juridical
artificialities, allowing e. g. the British partner to sell „Tornado“ fighter-
bombers to Arab or Asiatic countries with all their components made in
Germany, while the German partner and provider of essential parts was
not allowed to export. A European policy, laid down by the EU with the
assent of the European Council, would have to avoid such absurdities,
mostly created by ideological approaches in domestic politics. Whether
this will be politically possible, remains to be seen. But there will be no
European „industrial and technological basis for defence“ to support a
„European defence“ or even an active CESDP (or CEPSD), unless an
overall European policy with regulating power enhances defence indus-
trial co-operation by joint procurement and a European armaments budget
with rules on expenditure binding for all, authorizes and controls exports
and chooses the countries, into which European arms may be exported
and under which conditions for use and arms control to be agreed upon
with the external partners.
A fifth precondition is acting in accord with NATO requirements, stan-
dards and interoperability requirements between allied forces, which is
essentially interoperability of European and US forces in NATO and out-
side NATO for „peace support missions“ (crisis management, conflict
limitation and termination, peace consolidation) with military forces,
which have sustainability, flexibility, mobility and fire power for peace
enforcement against armed opposition.Lothar Rühl
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This NATO requirement can be at cross-purposes with European objec-
tives, since standardization in the NATO military co-operation framework
means procurement of equipment which meets the US/NATO standards
and can be used by both US and European forces with logstical support
from either side or from common sources: NATO depots. A case in point
was the ammunitions supply for the US forces in Saudi-Arabia during in
the Gulf conflict 1990/91 from Germany, both from US/NATO stocks
and German national stocks. Standardization can be limited to items of
common use by different weapons systems, such as fuel, munitions, elec-
trical components, batteries, electrical aggregates or mechanical devices
for filling petrol into vehicles or pumping water. This kind of standardi-
zation is essential for common logistics and for facilitating joint opera-
tions in the field. But it is only marginal by comparison with the main
weapons systems such as tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery
pieces, helicopters or technical command & control sets, mobile head
quarters, battle information systems and communications, not to speak of
aircraft, missiles, satellites, surveillance and observation systems and
ships. For any partner in any alliance the first question is about „auto-
nomy“ (as proclaimed by the EU Cologne summit in June 1999 for the
CEPSD (or CESDP) of the EU member-states vis-a-vis the US and
NATO), unless all allies were truly „integrated“ in one single „command
and force structure“ with unified multinational armed forces. This ideal
military „integration“ never exists in any coalition or alliance force. It
does not exist in NATO. Therefore, the various national contingents to
„Allied Command Europe“ in NATO form a coalition force, which is
coherent but equipped with different arms and matériel within a minimum
standardization framework for limited interoperability of US forces in
Europe with European NATO forces. This system does not include the
non-NATO member-states of the EU Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ire-
land.
But it does not include France either, since France is on her own since
1967 and has not really returned to the system of allied military co-
operation. However, France has several military equipments in commonConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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with fully „integrated“ NATO partners such as Germany (combat heli-
copters, transport aircraft, anti-air missile systems, naval missile sys-
tems). Spain has limited cooperation and standardization as well but cer-
tain weapons systems in common with the US as do other NATO part-
ners, i. p. combat aircraft and air-to-ground missiles, ship missiles and
command & control equipments. Germany has a large across-the-board
joint procurement of major weapons systems both with the US (combat
aircraft, air-to-ground missiles, ship missiles and ground-based anti-air
missiles) and with France. There is the example of tripartite armaments
co-operation between Britain, Germany and Italy ( the „Tornado“ combat
aircraft for various functions) or between these three countries and Spain
(the not yet deployed „Eurofighter 2000“).
In conclusion it can be said that a variety of bi-national, tri-national or
multinational co-operation agreements for arms development, production
and procurement have been successful in Europe by all standards: techni-
cal, economic, operational, logistical and political. The consequence for a
‘European arms procurement agency’ or ‘armaments pool’, which have
been talked about in Europe for the last 4o years but never materialized,
are not obvious: Exclusive European arms development, production and
procurement may or may not serve European security and economic in-
terests better than transatlantic ones. But they have never ever, so far,
served standardization and interoperability in NATO between European
and US forces. They have been more or less compatible with NATO
standards and logistical requirements as have US products and standards.
But there is no doubt that a „European armaments pool“ with exclusivity,
i.e. an obligation for all EU partners to procure only „European“ or „Eu-
ropeanized“ equipment for European armed forces would not tend to
promote alliance unity across the Atlantic and that it would not serve
NATO standardization with the US. It is questionable that it would pro-
mote European military technology and contribute to reach a competitive
level with US technologies. There is a case to be made for transatlantic
technological-industrial co-operation versus an exclusive European one
for European industries and forces only. Equipment of European airLothar Rühl
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forces in NATO gives some indications: Smaller European air forces have
always, since the creation of allied forces, tended to procure American
combat aircraft, missiles and associated technology for target acquisition
and weapons release, for Radar systems and command & control equip-
ments, as well as for ground-based anti-air missiles. The smaller the
number of items to be used, the more economic procurement by a large
provider becomes. This rule even applies to larger demands: The FRG
ordered 750 F-104 fighter-bombers to equip its air force. The aircraft’s
safety and performance remained in doubt, but the procurement proved to
be mutually advantageous in the end and it provided the first technological
base for the new West German aircraft industry after the war: By which
criteria should one evaluate the F-104 „Starfighter“ procurement, which
was not exclusively German in NATO?
The German Air Force has maintained ever since that it succeeded to be-
come one of the three best performing air forces in NATO thanks to the
F-104 co-operation wirth the US inspite of the shortcomings of the „Ger-
man version“ of that aircraft. The tripartite „Tornado“ heavy fighter-
bomber and armed reconnaissance penetrator, that has been a paramount
success so far, both in the Gulf War in 1991 and in the former Yugoslavia
in 1995 and 1999, has not been procured by the smaller European NATO
countries simply for economic reasons: Comparable American aircraft
come cheaper, even if their performance is no match for the „Tornado“
or simply not better. This may happen to the „Eurofighter 2000“ - but it
is not really important in and for NATO. Is it important for „a European
defence“ in the EU framework? The EU policy-makers will have to an-
swer this question. Does an effective CEPSD (or CESDP) really need
„European arms“? Or could an armaments mix between US and European
systems and components be more advantageous for NATO standardization
and interoperability as well as for alliance coherence in a larger „transat-
lantic partnership“? The EU governments will have to answer the ques-
tion and establish the „trade-offs“ between economic, technological, lo-
gistical, operational and political advantages and disadvantages for the
optimal solution. This task demands expertise and objectivity in choosingConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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between realistic options. The answer will hardly be: „Buy European“.
The re-inforcement of the „technological-industrial base“ for a „European
defence“ is both necessary and difficult to achieve in transatlantic eco-
nomic and political terms - quite apart from the operational-logistical con-
siderations for interallied military co-operation. But it stands to reason
that the EU must develop its own arms procurement and military technol-
ogy policies, if a solid European base for a common security and defence
policy and a possible „European defence“ in the future are to be pre-
pared. It is essential that the common “European” purpose match the
common NATO purpose and hence the requirements of standardization
and interoperability in “Allied Command Europe”.
2. The complexity of the economic-industrial tasks requires an optimal
management organisation in the EU within the framework of an organized
joint planning for European defence production and procurement, not
necessarily within the EU Commission. It is even preferable to farm out
this task to a European armaments and procurement agency under the po-
litical authority of a EU Defencec Ministers Council, that could be as-
sisted by the „Military Committee“ for the definition of the requirements
and by a committee of the Armaments Directors in the Defence Ministries
of the participating member-states. The experience so far has shown that
it is extremely difficult for the national armaments directors to reach a
solid agreement on anything, i. p. between more than two or three.
Therefore, the armaments directors cannot be counted upon to decide in
common on major projects, involving national interests in terms of previ-
ous investment into development and production, active plants and jobs,
new implantations and new technologies. All European defence ministers
are armaments ministers and armed forces ministers (even if in some gov-
ernments as in the British case there are divisions of political responsibil-
ity between several politicians within the defence ministry). Therefore
they must be obliged to answer both the questions of military require-
ments and budgetary constraints, the combination of which determines
planning and procurement. The EU needs a defence ministers council
anyway if the a common defence policy is to become a reality. This coun-Lothar Rühl
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cil must act as the force planning and armaments committee of the EU,
taking into account the NATO obligations for the NATO members and
the NATO force planning goals. The main responsibility must be the
budgetary outlays for defence, on which they cannot decide but on which
they can and must make joint recommendations in view of the military
necessities and their own national defence budgets for their forces.
This is a capital point: The European Council of the Chiefs of State and
Government must decide on broad orientations for a truly common de-
fence policy as well as for the application of the CFSP in general and on
specific policy objectives. It cannot decide on force structures, operational
capabilities and military options in defined contingencies unless it is pro-
vided with a common European force planning and budget structure in-
cluding all national inputs as well as with a common force structure in-
cluding all equipments and logistical supplies available over time: No na-
tional government can make forces ready for use in conflict or prepare
such forces unless it has a precise knowledge of the resources, the budg-
etary outlays and the financing of the expenditure as well as the force goal
and procurement planning cycle, which is in general a continuing one
over five years as in NATO. The defence ministers council must submit
the same document to all governments involved. The budget, personnel
and armaments directors of all the concerned national defence ministries
as well as all the General Staffs of the national Armed Forces of the par-
ticipating EU member-states must be associated in preparing the ‘Joint
Defence Ministers’ Report on Armed Forces, Armaments and the Plan-
ning Cycle’ to the European Council, which would have to be the basic
document for making political decisions on strategic orientiations and the
commitment of EU forces in crisis and conflict, always taking into ac-
count the commitments to NATO and the NATO force planning cycle as
well as the various international commitments of forces to the UN (or the
OSCE).
This procedure would mean that the defence ministers would have to
work together on force planning and budgets as well as on armamentsConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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planning. The result over time would be a synergetic effect leading to a
convergence of the various national armed forces in the EU - always un-
der the rule of the NATO commitments of the various partners - and to a
growing multinational organisation of these armed forces in multinational
force structures, for which the JCFS between NATO and WEU within the
NATO framework are an example. Coherence needs co-ordination and
the Defence Ministers Council of the EU would have to offer this advan-
tage, measuring at each point in the progressive process the trade-offs
with NATO inputs and the compatibility between EU and NATO efforts.
There should not be a quasi-independent EU/WEU force planning author-
ity, which would develop its own international bureaucracy, committed to
jointness and supranational objectives but isolated from national planning
and politics. „Subsidiarity“ should rule the co-ordination and the relations
between the national defence ministers as a committee on the govern-
ments’ side and the European authority: The defence ministers must rep-
resent both. If this could not be achieved, then any EU Defence Ministers
Council or armaments committee and even the Military Committee would
go down the same way as the Ministers of Agriculture or other EU min-
isterial councils where there is nothing more than the sum of national in-
terests on the lowest common denominator. This is not a matter of ideal-
ism: Either this convergence of national interests and means in the domain
of defence and armaments can be achieved over time or the project of a
common defence policy is dead.
The national defence ministers have the personnel and the data for organ-
izing a European defence and armaments co-operation, but they do not
have necessarily the political authority and domestic political support
needed to decide and to enforce decisions taken in common. This is the
supreme task of the Chiefs of Government (it is not certain how and to
what end a „Chief of State“ can really contribute to such decisions, but
the French case can be put aside since France has a Prime Minister and
since the French Constitution declares that „the Government conducts the
nation’s policy“ and is „responsible for national defence“). For manage-Lothar Rühl
24
ment reasons the question has to be answered whether the defence minis-
ters of the EU and the WEU should meet alone as a defence and arma-
ments committee apart from the joint ministerial council with the foreign
ministers. There are good reasons for joint sessions in the domain of pol-
icy-making, but the management of common armed forces or force
structures, armaments or arms procurement, budget requirements and di-
vision of labour within the EU for defence as well as the liaison with
NATO force planning should be left to the defence ministers as the politi-
cal managers of the armed forces, the armaments and the defence budgets
of their governments.
There is, of course, a ‘third dimension’: the ministers of finance. The na-
tional treasuries rule the expenditure of the governments. Chiefs of Gov-
ernment usually side with their ministers of finance on the budget. There-
fore the finance ministers should be directly associated with defence and
force planing as they had been at the beginning in NATO. It was a capital
mistake to release them from the obligation to assist in the NAC and
hereby to assist force goal planning at the creation, assuming political re-
sponsibility for military expenditure in international terms and in an inter-
national body. It is doubtful whether the finance ministers will allow
themselves to be recruited again for defence and force planning, commit-
ting them to expenditure. But they should be made to send high officials
from their departments as their representatives and to order those to con-
tribute to the work of defence and force goal planning. In the German
case this has been extremely difficult in the NATO context: The bureau-
cracy of the treasury departments of all governments tries not to engage
itself for general policy objectives and not to commit resources early in
the game. This is natural. But the European Council has to decide
whether its is itself committed to an effective active common defence
policy or whether it wishes only to add another rhetorical exercise to the
European „acquis“ in the field of security and defence.
3. These considerations lead to the institutional-political issues posed by
the Cologne project.Conditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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At issue is above all the unity of action of either the EU as an association
of states or of a „core“ group of member-states, a permanent ‘coalition of
the able and willing’. The Franco-British initiative of St. Malo in Decem-
ber 1998 observes on this critical point „Europeans will operate within
the institutional framework of the EU. The reinforcement of European
solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states.
The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be re-
spected“. The objective, according to the St. Malo text, is double: a) to
give to the EU „the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credi-
ble military forces“ with „the means to decide to use them and the readi-
ness to do so, in order to respond to international crises“; b) to preserve
„the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe
(set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels
Treaty)“ and „acting in conformity with our respective obligations in
NATO“. In fact, the collective defence commitment in the WEU treaty is
in the original text embedded in article 4, which stipulates that in case of
„an armed attack in Europe“ against a member, all other members „will
give assistance and support with all military and other means within their
power“, which is more than the signatories of the North Atlantic treaty of
Washington undertook one year later in April 1949 by agreeing to article
5 on this treaty, since it does only require the allies to give „assistance“
by taking those measures in unison with the other partners, which they
consider necessary to maintain or restore the security of the North Atlan-
tic treaty area, „including by the use of armed forces“. This was a long
way from giving support and assistance „with all military and other
means within their power“. For this reason, NATO was based on com-
mon military structures with alliance forces in permanent readiness by
binding commitments of specific „pre-designated“ forces to be „assigned“
to „Allied Command Europe“ in a joint force and defence planning cycle,
in order to make up for the relative loose commitment of military forces
to the defence of an ally according to the treaty language. The WEU part-
ners abdicated their common European defence and armed forces to the
care and control of NATO (as far as military integration went, with theLothar Rühl
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national sovereignty over the armed forces remaining intact). But their
treaty remains after 50 years and with it the far-reaching ‘casus foederis’
of its article 4. In 1986 the members of the then re-activated, newly or-
ganized and enlarged WEU specified in their political guidelines docu-
ment „Political Platform“, adopted at the Hague, that each member
country would be defended by all on its outer borders - meaning collec-
tive forward defence for all of Western Europe within the WEU bounda-
ries. This was not to mean that the European NATO allies associated with
each other in the WEU would go beyond military NATO commitments or
develop separate European defence structures. But the Hague text reaf-
firmed their political commitment to common defence and security.
Whatever the EC of the Union may have had in mind at Cologne, when
declaring that the WEU would have „fulfilled its purpose“, once the new
project CESDP would have been implemented, the Brussels treaty goes
far beyond the scope of CESDP and the 1992 „Petersberg missions“ for
the WEU. There is no other contractual commitment by the EU partners
on security, similar to the alliance clause of this treaty and the political
philosophy of the Hague platform. Therefore, the question has to be
asked and answered: what is to become of the WEU with the Brussels
treaty after 1999-2000 in the perspective of the CESDP and of the union
treaties, envisaging the absorption of the WEU into the EU? Will there be
strong European mutual commitments for collective defence in a „Euro-
pean alliance“ within the North Atlantic alliance with the US and Canada,
Turkey and Norway? Or will the European defence treaty be simply
abandoned by its members in favour of the unequal couple NATO/EU?
If the latter were the case, several political and institutional as well as
military consequences would follow:
- First. The EU or at least the former WEU members of the EU would
have to maintain the Combined Joint Force Structure and Combined Joint
Task Force arrrangements between NATO and the WEU on the use of
NATO command and force structures, operational procedures and mili-
tary assets, including US assets, if and when the US does not participateConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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but consent to an all-European operation for „peace support missions“
outside the North Atlantic treaty area. These members would also have to
discharge the responsibilities for joint efforts in support of NATO forces,
readiness, sustainability, deployment capability, flexibility and mobility of
European forces in NATO as well as for the implementation of European
NATO programmes, which the WEU assumed from the former „Euro-
group“ in NATO it has replaced.
The defence ministers of those countries would have to carry these tasks
and responsibilities into the organisms of the (CEPSD) CESDP within the
EU structures of „strategic planning“ and political decision-making.
The WEU, based on the Brussels Treaty in its version of 1955, is men-
tioned in this text only in one narrow context on the EU as an organisa-
tion:...“the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant
strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the
existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the
EU“....
The European Council’s Cologne Declaration of 1999 repeats the key
phrases of St. Malo without mentioning the „collective defence“ quality
of the WEU Treaty of Brussels and its Article V, the alliance clause with
the mutual obligation of military support in case of a threat of aggression.
While this omission privileges NATO and the EU-NATO relations, which
do not exist as yet, it begs the question of the continuation of the Brussels
treaty and the use, that could be made of it in the future by the EU mem-
bers. It also raises the question of European military co-operation in
NATO and whether the European allies are to continue as a European
group in NATO, once the WEU would be discontinued or simply de-
activated. Since 1985 the WEU has been progressively reinforced in its
organisation as have its links with NATO and its competences in the field
of military planning for international security operations outside collective
defence, (for the so-called „non-article 5 contingencies“) in which the
European allies could respond without the US and NATO to a crisis. IfLothar Rühl
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the WEU did disappear, absorbed by the EU, a special EU group would
have to be created for the purposes, now served by the WEU inside
NATO and parallel to NATO, e. g. with the Combined Joint Task Forces
and Force Structures.
It can be assumed that the WEU military committee could serve as the
military committee for the CEPSD or CESDP group in the EU as could
the military staff. But the commanders of European forces for acting on
behalf of the CESDP would have to be either in the NATO command
structure, as is the case since 1996 with the European Deputy SACEUR
as the pre-designated Commander of European force components serving
outside NATO for peace support missions, or he would have to be ap-
pointed by the EU independently from NATO, which would mean with
no command authority over NATO forces and no assured recourse on
NATO command & control or force structures and military assets. This
does not seem to be the preferred choice as far as the Franco-British St.
Malo declaration and the Cologne CESDP Declaration by the EU Council
are concerned. If this assumption is correct, then the EU must decide to
either commission the WEU group of its members to carry on and assure
the organic links with NATO, that is to act for the entire EU as the politi-
cal decision-making authority on NATO matters and international crisis
response, i.e. deal with the entire security and defence policy, or to set up
a new permanent core group of participants in both CEPSD or CESDP
and the older CFSP in order to provide the councils of the Union with the
expertise and guidance, required for swift crisis response and „relevant
strategic planning“ (as the Cologne text reads on this point), but also to
establish a political crisis management organism and an authority to con-
trol European forces, to be commissioned by the EU for international se-
curity and peace support missions.
As long as only very small and short contingencies for crisis management
with military forces, as in Albania, arise, some European allies could act
to-gether with a small mixed force and an autonomous commander, as
was the case in Albania in 1997 for French, Italian and some other na-Conditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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tional contingents under French command. For greater simplicity, speed
and flexibility, but also to avoid political complications, this operation
was not given to the WEU. Hence, it is an untypical case. But what, if
the emerging Civil War in Albania had spread and lasted, and a much
larger force had been required to contain and end it? In that case, either
NATO or the WEU would have had to intervene and then the CJTF
would have been called upon - unless the allies had simply decided (with
US consent and participation) that a NATO response was the right answer
to the situation as had been the case in Bosnia in 1995 or in the Kosovo in
1999.
The consequences of such possibilities are obvious and inescapable:
a) The EU needs a Defence Ministers Council with political authority
over armed force contingents, made available by member-states for use
by the EU in application of common decisions and over both the military
committee and international military staff, last not least over a military
commander of EU forces, either within the NATO command structure or
outside in an independent EU framework. The latter would mean „dupli-
cation“ and also separation from the common alliance structure. It follows
that the best solution - in truth the only sensible one - would be the con-
firmation of the existing NATO/WEU set-up and its adaptation to the new
situation in the EU with its common security and defence policies, linked
in the more general objectives of the European foreign policies, agreed
upon in the EC..
b) All decisions taken on the use of armed force and the engagement of
forces committed to the EU for operations must be reached by a majority
of member-states, which are also active participants in the NATO military
co-operation system. Otherwise the link to NATO and to the US could be
weakened or become inoperable.
c) The European Council must issue its political guidelines and strategic
directions for the implementation of both the CFSP and the CEPSD or
CESDP to the foreign ministers and the defence ministers. It should
regularly hear the reports and advice of the military committee and in-Lothar Rühl
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struct the defence ministers to deal with the implications, reporting back
to the EC.
d) The foreign ministers must take possible military consequences of their
policies into account, including the financial and personnel requirements
in the perspective of changing situations, escalation of crises and conflicts
and mounting costs, risks and losses. This requires joint meetings of the
foreign and defence ministers both on a regular routine basis and ad hoc
for dealing with extraordinary events or issues. It also required discus-
sions with the military committee and, if appointed, with a European
commander-in-chief for European forces outside NATO - again the ad-
vantage of making use of the present organisation with the combined joint
command and force structures between NATO and the WEU becomes
obvious.
In all, an organized European defence policy and crisis response by the
EU raises inevitably the issues of concentration and of political solidarity
between all EU member-states for unity of action outside collective de-
fence in the field of international security.
In order to rise to the challenge, the institutional response by the EU must
cover four main domains:
a) the ultimate decision-making authority of the EC of Chiefs of State and
Governments on all principal matters concerning the common foreign,
security and defence policies, preferably by a qualified majority of NATO
members, but with the rule of free participation in decision-making, not-
withstanding NATO membership or an independent status outside NATO,
on the basis of participation in the measures to be taken, including the use
of military means and armed force; it has to be taken into account, how-
ever, that decision-making for CESDP as for the more general CFSP is to
rest „on an intergovernmental basis“, at least in the common view of
Britain and France, expressed in the St. Malo declaration „on European
Defence“, and this applies also to other major members of the EU, i. p.
to Germany and Spain, Denmark and Greece. It certainly applies to non-
NATO/WEU countries such as Sweden and Austria. This reality points toConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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the deeper problem of European unity in the field of international military
security even outside the existing alliance frameworks of collective de-
fence, national control over the armed forces being reserved anyway as
expression of national sovereignty and independence.
b) central political control of the EC via the ministerial councils of the
preparations for decision-making by the military committee with the in-
ternational military staff and by the envisaged expert committee on secu-
rity policy;
c) either use of the WEU as the EU agency for security and defence pol-
icy, an „integral“ part of the EU structures (as envisaged by the Maas-
tricht and Amsterdam Treaties) or else the creation of a European Group,
based on a new modification of the Brussels Treaty in order to maintain
the alliance clause for collective defence in Europe (article 4/5), to main-
tain the link with NATO and to accommodate the EU as a „security and
defence union“ with the option of organizing union forces for use in ap-
plication of the CESDP;
d) a political crisis response capacity by a standing group of senior advis-
ers to the EC and the ministerial councils, unification of the responsibili-
ties for the CFP and the CESDP in the person of a High Representative or
High Commissioner, answering directly to the EC of the Chiefs of State
and Government and participating in the ministerial councils on interna-
tional affairs and general affairs within the community framework, the
ministerial councils on CFSP and CESDP and assisting in the EC delib-
erations as political adviser and as executive secretary general. He should
have equal rank with the President of the EU Commission and a sufficient
political-military staff with operational-logistical resources, budgeted un-
der the authority of the EC. All CESDP organisms, such as a crisis re-
sponse cell, a strategic planning group, intellligence review and analysis
centers should be placed under his control and at his disposal. This could
best be done by organizing links with the WEU.
If or as long as the WEU were to be maintained, the High Representative
or Commissioner for Security and Defence Policy of the EU should alsoLothar Rühl
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hold the office of Secretary General of the WEU. In this capacity he
should continue to assist the meetings of the North Atlantic Council as an
observer and invite the Secretary General of NATO to assist in the delib-
erations of the CESDP ministerial councils of the EU.
4. Most of what has been mentioned above under the aspects of technol-
ogy & armaments and under institutional-political aspects, also has strate-
gic and operational military implications.
For CEPSD or CESDP the main issues are „strategic direction“ or ori-
entation of the policies to be adopted and control of implementation of
decisions. The Chiefs of State and Government stated their intent to pro-
vide „strategic direction“ and give political guidance. The main technical
task for an institutional solution than lies in the field of central control and
supervision of strategic planning. Military „command & control“ over the
various European armed forces is organized both in the national and the
interallied context. Nothing must or should be changed in this respect,
since the CEPSD or CESDP is only an intergovernmental function and
the EU is not expected in the foreseeable future to acquire its own „Euro-
pean armed forces“ or an common and integrated „European defence“.
Anyway the EU could best follow the time-honoured example of the
WEU, leaving the bulk of military responsibility and with it operational
command & control of the forces „assigned“ to NATO to the authorities
of the alliance. This has worked well even outside collective defence in
Bosnia with IFOR/SFOR and in Kosovo so far with KFOR as NATO-run
operations with external international participation. The same can be said
about the various „partnerships for peace“, associating the external part-
ners for international security with NATO bilaterally and assembling all
of them with the NATO members in the „Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council“: NATO in the centre is the nub of the big wheel. The EU can-
not take its place.
Operational autonomy for a European peace-making force will be always
relative to the dependence or reliance on NATO. It could be largest at the
highest level, that of political decision-making and strategic direction, theConditions and options for an autonomous CESDP (CEPSD)
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results of which would be part of the European input into the deliberations
of the NAC. Strategic analysis and conceptualization, analysis of intelli-
gence reports and evaluation of data, the programmes for European satel-
lite reconnaissance missions and their co-ordination with US capabilities
for mutual information, European strategic transport, communications,
information, surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence capacities all
need prior concepts, which would have to be examined closely against
cost effectiveness and relevance. These are typical tasks for the highest
political authority of the EU, since it is the this government authority,
which has to set priorities and to allocate resources for defined tasks at
accepted costs with budget planning and control of expenditures. Other
strategic-operational aspects can be left to the defence ministers, chiefs of
the national defence staffs and to the CEPSD or CESDP military com-
mittee of the EU. Most of these questions must be taken up with NATO
anyway, if the EU members with their European defence policy are to
„contribute to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance, which is the
foundation of the collective defence of its members“ in the words of the
messages from St. Malo and from Cologne.
In conclusion it is possible to state, that the perspectives opened in Co-
logne for the EU as a future European security union within the North
Atlantic Alliance can be filled with political substance and used for an
„autonomous“ role of EU-Europe in international politics and in interna-
tional security on two essential conditions: unity of action from the top
down in joint efforts with the appropriate structures and a strong link to
NATO in the transatlantic partnership with North America without aban-
doning European responsibilities to American care.ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-933307-54-6
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